secondary problem of protecting these data with different methods, all defined in a unified mathematical framework. A common definition of protection is used in four different methodologies. Two integer linear programming models described in the literature for the cell suppression methodology are extended to work also for the controlled rounding methodology. In addition, two relaxed variants are presented using two associated linear programming models, called partial cell suppression and partial controlled rounding, respectively. A final discussion shows how to combine the four methods and how to implement a cutting-plane approach for the exact and heuristic resolution of the combinatorial problems in practice. This approach was implemented in ARGUS, a software package of disclosure limitation tools.
Introduction
Statistical agencies are often required by law or policy to protect the confidentiality of the information they collect from persons, businesses, or other units. The microdata is the collection of all the individual responses, and a statistical table is the aggregation of one variable in accordance with other variables and including marginal sums. Before releasing statistical tables (or microdata files), these agencies use a variety of statistical methods to protect their data and to ensure that the risk of disclosure is controlled and very small. In essence, statistical agencies protect the confidentiality of the data they collect by restricting the amount of information in tabular data products (or microdata) that they release. Therefore, a common characteristic of all the methodologies is that they reduce the information to limit the disclosure risk, but with the aim of minimizing the loss of information. There are methodologies to protect microdata and others to protect statistical tables. This paper concerns only methodologies to protect statistical tables directly, i.e., modifying the table itself and not the original microdata. See, e.g., Duncan et al. (2001b) for other perturbation techniques where some respondent contributions (i.e., values in the original microdata) are modified, such as the addition of random noise by Evans et al. (1998) , data swapping by Fienberg et al. (1996) , and Markov perturbation by Duncan and Fienberg (1998) . We refer the reader to Willenborg and de Waal (2001) for a wider introduction to statistical data protection.
The importance of protecting tabular data has been clearly stated by governments awarding contracts to conduct research and issue reports on disclosure limitation methods for tabular data protection. For example, the National Institute of Statistical Sciences is supporting the U.S. project entitled "Digital Government," and EUROSTAT is coordinating the E.U. project entitled "Computational Aspects on Statistical Confidentiality" (CASC), both addressing the protection of tabular data (among other topics). The CASC project was the motivation for the current paper, and indeed the presented method was implemented inside the software ARGUS, which is the outcome of this three-year project, thus ensuring the current usefulness of the method.
In the area of statistical disclosure limitation, experts typically distinguish two different problems. The primary problem concerns the problem of identifying the sensitive data, i.e., the cell values corresponding to private information that cannot be released within a prescribed exactitude. The secondary problem (also called the complementary problem) consists of applying methods to guarantee some "protection requirements" while minimizing the "loss of information." This paper concerns only the secondary problem, and more precisely it presents models suitable for solving real-world instances through a cutting-plane approach. The most popular methodologies for solving the secondary problem are variants of the well-known cell suppression and controlled rounding methods. Nevertheless, the different methodologies are usually applied by practitioners without sharing Operations Research 53(5), pp. 819-829, © 2005 INFORMS similar hypotheses, thus making a comparison very difficult even on the same data. What is more, in practice, some implementations cannot inherently guarantee the protection requirements and a great computational effort must be applied to check the proposed release. This checking is called the disclosure auditing phase, and it consists of computing lower and upper bounds on the original value for each sensitive cell; in literature there are several techniques for performing this third phase, including linear and integer programming, the Frechet and Bonferroni bounds, and the Buzzigoli and Giusti shuttle algorithm (see, e.g., Duncan et al. 2001b for references and generalizations of these techniques). Dobra and Fienberg (2000) deals with Frechet-like formulas exhibited in the special case of decomposable graphs. In theory, one could apply Groebner bases; but in general, these are not computable by existing methods.
This paper presents variants of some classical methodologies, with the contribution that these variants implicitly guarantee the required protection for different sensitive cells and against different attackers, thus saving the effort of solving the disclosure auditing problem. Section 2 introduces the main concepts of the statistical disclosure control problem in a general context. Section 3 considers the wellknown cell suppression methodology, and §4 points out a relaxed version here referred to as the partial cell suppression methodology. Section 5 deals with the controlled rounding methodology, and §6 proposes a relaxed version called the partial controlled rounding methodology. For each version, a mixed integer linear programming model is described emphasizing the common definitions and features. By using the duality theory in linear programming (or Benders' decomposition; see, e.g., Wolsey 1998), it is possible to derive an improved model with a smaller number of variables and a bigger number of constraints. The advantage of the second model is that the number of variables is not dependent on the number of sensitive cells, and also there is no need for managing all the constraints explicitly because the relevant ones can be dynamically generated when required. These features are important because they suggest efficient algorithms using modern mathematical programming approaches. The paper ends with some conclusions leading to an all-in-one methodology.
This work has been presented in several seminars on disclosure limitation methods (Plymouth, April 2002; Ottawa, May 2002; Washington, June 2002) , and the cutting-plane algorithm is implemented in the -ARGUS software package for tabular data protection, an output of the CASC research project (see, e.g., Hundepool 2002).
General Situation
This section presents the basic concepts and notation that is used in the rest of the paper. They can be found in the literature (see, e.g., Willenborg and de Waal 2001) but are also given here for completeness.
A statistical agency is typically provided with a set of n values a = a i i ∈ I , where I = 1 n . Vector a is known as "nominal table" and satisfies a set of m equations i∈I m ij y i = b j for j ∈ J , where J = 1 m . For convenience of notation the linear system will be denoted by My = b, thus Ma = b holds. Each solution y of My = b is called congruent table. Matrix M (with n columns representing the cells and m rows representing the equations) has elements m ij typically in −1 0 +1 , with one −1 per row associated with the marginal-cell variable, while vector b is typically the zero vector. Observe that all types of multiway tables can be described by a general system My = b, where y represents the cell values and the equations define the marginal totals in the table. Because all the here-proposed ideas are based on the general system My = b, without any assumption on the structure of the matrix M, these ideas apply to any type of multiway table (including hierarchical, linked, and other structured tabular data).
On statistical tables there could be some sensitive data, i.e., information that cannot be disclosed because it shows confidential information on particular respondents. The sensitive cells in a tabular data are typically determined by common-sense rules (see, for example, Willenborg and de Waal 2001) . Figure 1 shows an example of a tabular data with n = 16 cells and m = 8 equations. We will assume that cell in activity II and region C is sensitive.
In a general situation, all the sensitive cells in a table must be protected against a set of attackers. The attackers are the intruders or data snoopers that will analyze the final product data and will try to disclose confidential information. They can also be coalitions of respondents who collude and behave as single intruders. The aim of the disclosure limitation methods is to reduce the risk of them succeeding. The set of attackers will be denoted by K. Each attacker knows the set of linear system My = b plus extra information that bounds each cell value. For example, the simplest attacker is the so-called external intruder, who knows only that unknown cell values are, say, nonnegative. Other, more accurate, attackers know tighter bounds on the cell values, and they are called internal attackers. For example, an internal attacker could be a respondent that had contributed to cell i with, say, 10 units; then he/she knows that y i 10, while the external attacker knows only y i 0. If the internal attacker also knows that he/she is the only contributor to cell i with value 10, then 10 y i 10 Figure 1 .
Investment of enterprises by activity and region. 
The values of these parameters can also be defined by using common-sense rules (see, e.g., Sande 1984 
Given a pattern, the mathematical problems of computing values y k p and y k p are known as attacker problems for cell p and attacker k. The overall problem of solving the attacker problems for all cells is called a disclosure auditing problem, which should not be confused with the disclosure auditing phase mentioned in §1 and which is an unnecessary phase for the methodologies proposed in this paper because they will implicitly guarantee the protection requirements on the output pattern. It is well known that when no probabilistic knowledge is assumed, the attacker problems associated with cell p and attacker k can be formulated as two optimization models on an array of variables y = y i i ∈ I representing a table. If the cell values a i are known to be integer numbers, then y i must be an integer variable, and the models are integer linear programs (ILP). Otherwise, y i is a continuous variable and the models are linear programs (LP). See Cox (2004) for the impact of that difference in the disclosure auditing phase. In this paper, we will assume that the cell entries are continuous; thus an attacker problem is
for all i ∈ I plus a set of additional constraints that make y feasible in accordance with the published pattern. The precise additional constraints depend on the structure of the pattern and therefore on the considered methodology. The other attacker problem is obtained by replacing the objective function with y k p = max y p . Each section of this paper shows the precise additional constraints for each methodology.
Finally, among all possible valid patterns, the statistical office is interested in finding one with minimum information loss. The information loss of a pattern is intended to be a measure of the number of congruent tables in the pattern. Indeed, a valid pattern must always allow the nominal table to be a congruent table feasible with it, but it must also contain other different congruent tables so as to keep the risk of disclosure controlled. For example, when the pattern contains only the original table (because there is no sensitive data to be protected), then the loss of information is clearly zero. The precise definition of loss of information depends on the structure of the pattern, and hence on the methodology to be considered. In practice, because it is not always easy to count the number of congruent tables in a pattern from the point of view of an intruder k, the loss of information of a pattern is replaced by the sum of the loss of information of its cells. In this case, the individual cost for cell p is generally proportional to the difference between the worst-case situations (i.e., to y k p − y k p ), it is proportional to the number of respondents contributing to the cell value a p , or it is simply a positive fixed cost when a p is not published (i.e., when y k p − y k p > 0). It could be interesting to use a definition of loss of information for a pattern given by a distance between the original table and, for example, the most probable table for the intruder k among the congruent ones with the final pattern, but this is not an easy task in practice because the probability distribution of y p in y k p y k p is not available. Dobra et al. (2003) present a Bayesian treatment for this problem in tables of counts.
In practice most of the available software is based on techniques for finding "good" patterns with no inherent guarantee on the protection level requirements, i.e., not necessarily valid (see, for example, Duncan et al. 2001b) . Therefore, it is necessary to check the proposed pattern before it is made public by solving the disclosure auditing problem and to try a different technique when the result is negative. It is well known (see, for example, Duncan et al. 2001b ) that auditing a pattern could consume many computing resources. In the next sections, we introduce precise methodologies to find a valid pattern (if any exists) with minimum (or near-minimum) information loss, hence the disclosure auditing phase is not required.
Cell Suppression Methodology
Cell suppression is one of the most popular techniques for protecting sensitive information in statistical tables. The standard cell suppression technique is based on the idea of protecting the sensitive information by hiding (suppressing) the values of some cells with a symbol (for example, * ). Obviously, the sensitive cells must be suppressed, and they are called primary suppressions, but other cells must also be suppressed, and they are called secondary suppressions.
A pattern in cell suppression is then defined by a subset of cells SUP to be unpublished. Obviously, P ⊆ SUP. Then, the feasible region for the attacker problems associated with attacker k is defined by For the definition of the loss of information of a cell suppression pattern, an estimation w i of the loss of information is given when cell i (with nominal value a i ) is not published. Then the loss of information of a pattern determined by SUP is defined as sum of w i for all i ∈ SUP (see, e.g., Willenborg and de Waal 2001 for details and examples on how the statistical offices can generate the values w i and other input parameters). Other, more elaborated definitions of loss of information for balancing protection with utility are given in Trottini (2001) and Duncan et al. (2001a) . Following the requirements of the national statistical offices motivating our work, this section addresses the combinatorial problem when the information loss defined by i∈SUP w i , and the presented models are independent of the criteria used by the statistical office to fix w i .
The problem of finding a valid pattern with a minimum loss of information is a very difficult combinatorial problem. The task is so complex that in the literature there Cell suppression pattern. are mainly heuristic approaches (i.e., procedures providing approximated-probably overprotected-suppression patterns) for special situations. Even the relaxation that considers one intruder (an external attacker) is a strongly NP-hard problem (see, for example, Kelly et al. 1992) , meaning that the existence of an algorithm for the exact solution of the combinatorial problem that guarantees an efficient (i.e., polynomial time) performance for all possible input instances is very unlikely. Previous works mainly concentrate on two-way tables with marginals and protection against a single attacker. Heuristic solution procedures have been proposed by several authors, including Cox (1980 Cox ( , 1995 , Sande (1984) , Kelly et al. (1992) , and Carvalho et al. (1994) . Kelly et al. (1992) proposed a mixed ILP formulation, and Geurts (1992) refined this model. Heuristics for three-way tables have been proposed in Robertson (1994) , Sande (1984) , and Dellaert and Luijten (1999) . Fischetti and Salazar (2001) proposed a new method to protect a general table against a single attacker. We will summarize here the models to emphasize their similarities with the ones presented for the other methodologies in the next sections. Let us consider a binary variable x i associated with each cell i ∈ I, assuming value 1 if such cell must be suppressed in the released pattern, or 0 otherwise. Note that attacker k will minimize and maximize unknown values on the set of consistent tables in the pattern, defined by 
Partial Cell Suppression Methodology
The partial cell suppression methodology was introduced by Fischetti and Salazar (2003) to protect a table against one attacker. In this section, we present models to address different attackers so it can be integrated in a more general framework with other methodologies. A pattern is a set of intervals, one y subject to
and, for all p ∈ P and all k ∈ K:
for all , , satisfying (2) and, for all , , satisfying (3). Activity I  18  24  50  6  12  80  Activity II  4  10  19  20  26  49  Activity III  17  32  12  61   Total  45  101  44  190 is defined by This objective function can be modified to produce a pattern with different statistical properties. For example, values a i could be replaced by a i to steer the algorithm toward finding a pattern closer to values a i rather than to values a i . The vector a = a i i ∈ I does not need to be a congruent table and can be defined by using random distributions based on the experience of the statistical office. In this way, the algorithm will stop with a pattern v with a minimum distance with respect to a , and therefore this pattern will probably have better statistical properties. No matter how the objective function is defined, the constraints in the model ensure that v is a valid pattern.
My
The cell publication methodology is closely related to the cell suppression methodology described in §3. Similar critiques done in literature (e.g., Dobra et al. 2003) on the definition of loss of information of a classical cell suppression pattern could be extended to a partial cell suppression pattern. Still, the two methodologies differ in important features. Indeed, from a cell suppression pattern, each attacker, after solving the disclosure auditing problem, will replace the missing values by intervals of possible values. Therefore, from an attacker's point of view, patterns from both methods could have the same form. Nevertheless, the classical cell suppression methodology is a "yes-or-no" approach, where a cell must be published or not, while in the interval publication the value of each unsafe cell is replaced by an interval that can be quite wide. This extra freedom in partial cell suppression has the advantage of providing patterns containing a smaller number of congruent tables than the ones from classical cell suppression, and hence increasing the data utility of the pattern to the user. In other words, the set of congruent tables associated with a valid cell suppression pattern coincides with the set of congruent tables associated with a valid partial cell suppression pattern, but the reverse is not true. Because the region of valid patterns in partial cell suppression contains the region of valid patterns in cell suppression, one could expect to find solutions with the smallest loss of information.
Another important advantage of the cell suppression methodology is that the optimization problem associated with it has a much simpler computational complexity (i.e., it admits a polynomial algorithm). Nevertheless, optimal partial cell suppression solutions have the disadvantage of containing more intervals than missing values in optimal cell suppression patterns.
Mathematical Model
A first LP model for the combinatorial problem requires the introduction of two continuous variables z + i and z − i for each i ∈ I, which will represent the relative increment and decrement, respectively, of the extreme bounds of the interval from the nominal value a i . Hence, the published intervals will be defined by y and linking constraints between the z + z − and the auxiliary variables. As in the previous section, it is again possible to avoid the explicit introduction of the auxiliary variables f kp and g kp (k ∈ K and p ∈ I) along with the associated linking constraints by using the standard LP duality theory. Indeed, and, for all p ∈ P and all k ∈ K:
satisfying (6), the feasible region of the attacker problems associated with attacker k is now defined by
This second LP model is illustrated in Figure 7 , where 
Combining Cell Suppression and the Partial Variant
It is possible to merge the cell suppression and the partial cell suppression methodologies into one. This combined methodology has advantages of both approaches because, for example, it benefits from providing the partial cell suppression pattern while being able to keep control on the maximum number of proper intervals, and also on their minimum width.
In the unified methodology a pattern is a set of intervals, as in the partial cell suppression method. Therefore, for the mathematical description, the variables z Figure 7 . A relevant observation is that the new models allow a constraint to keep the number of intervals smaller than a given threshold q, i.e., i∈I x i q.
Controlled Rounding Methodology
In controlled rounding methodology we are also provided with an input base number r i for each cell i. Let us denote by a i the multiple of r i obtained by rounding down a i , and by a i the multiple of r i obtained by rounding up a i . When r i is such that a i = a i , we redefine r i = 0, hence r i = a i − a i for all i ∈ I.
A pattern in the controlled rounding methodology is a congruent table v = v i i ∈ I such that v i ∈ a i a i (7) Figure 8 gives an example of pattern when r i = 5 i ∈ I for the instance in Figure 1 . The values r i are assumed to be known by the attackers. The feasible region for the attacker problems associated with attacker k is defined by Activity I  20  50  10  80  Activity II  10  20  20  50  Activity III  15  30  15  60   Total  45  100  45  190 The natural concept of "loss of information" of a cell is defined as the difference v i − a i between the nominal value and the published value, and then the loss of information of a pattern is the sum of all the individual loss of information. This objective function can be modified to minimize the distance between the published table and another array a , as mentioned for the partial cell suppression methodology. The array a does not need to be a valid table but simply a collection of values with a desirable statistical property. To illustrate this idea, set a to be a random rounding table from a (see Cox 1987) , which is unbiased but with the disadvantage of not being a valid table. By minimizing i∈I v i − a i , the models presented in this paper will produce a valid pattern v closest to a , and therefore are very close to being unbiased. See Salazar (2005) for computational experiments supporting this observation.
One of the main difficulties of this methodology is that a feasible pattern does not always exist, even when all r i are the same base numbers. A necessary condition for feasibility is that
2r p for all k ∈ K and p ∈ P but it is not sufficient (even if all protection levels are zero). The combinatorial problem of finding (if any) a protected pattern with minimum information loss is called a controlled rounding problem. The problem was first introduced by Bacharach (1966) in the context of replacing nonintegers by integers in tabular arrays, and currently it arises in several application contexts. To reduce the complexity of finding a feasible pattern, typically all base numbers are equal, as in the example. Nevertheless, with such simplification and when the protection levels are not considered, the existence of a feasible pattern is ensured on two-dimensional tables (Cox and Ernst 1982) , but not on general multidimensional tables with marginal totals; Causey et al. (1985) showed a simple infeasible 2 × 2 × 2 instance. Kelly et al. (1990) proposed a branch-and-bound procedure for the case of three-dimensional tables, based on the LP relaxation of an ILP model. Heuristic methods for the problem on multidimensional tables have been proposed by several authors, including Kelly et al. (1990) . Fischetti and Salazar (1998) proposed a branch-and-bound procedure for its resolution, and some relaxation of the combinatorial problem when it is infeasible. All these previous works concern only the problem of finding a table without dealing with the protection levels. We present here a general model for linked tables that guarantee a table protected against different attackers. The mechanism extends the one described in the previous sections.
Let us consider a binary variable x i for each cell i, representing
Note that when a solution x i is given, then the published table is determined by v i = a i +r i x i for all i ∈ I. The loss to the tight constraints (7). Therefore, a different way of ensuring the existence of protected patterns is to relax conditions (7) and to look for a congruent table v = v i i ∈ I such that
where a i and a i are given in advance from the statistical office such that a i a i a i . These extreme values can be defined as the numbers nearest to a i that are multiples of a given number (i.e., defined as in the standard controlled rounding methodology from a given base number), but they can also be the two values within a given difference with respect to a i (i.e., a i = a i −t i and a i = a i + t i for a given base number t i > 0). Figure 11 shows a possible pattern for the nominal table in Figure 1 .
One can expect that, as in the controlled rounding methodology, the loss of information of a cell i can be defined to be proportional to v i − a i , so the loss of information of a pattern measures a distance between the published table v and the original table a. Nevertheless, this is a bad criterion because if all constraints (7) are removed and no new one is required, then the valid pattern with minimum loss of information is the nominal table, i.e., v = a. Hence, some constraints from (7) must remain (for example, the one concerning the sensitive cells) or, in a much simpler way, it could be required that the published values in each sensitive cell must be equal to some given values. An alternative procedure is to define the loss of information as a distance between the pattern v and a given array a , as discussed in the controlled rounding section. By appropriately choosing a , the objective function in the model will steer the optimization algorithm to find a valid pattern with better statistical properties.
Let r i = a i − a i , a known information for attackers. The attacker problems associated with attacker k are now exactly the same as in the controlled rounding Activity I  20  50  10  80  Activity II  7  16  26  49  Activity III  18  35  8  61   Total  45  101  44  190 methodology. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for feasibility is that max k∈K SPL
To write an LP model for the partial controlled rounding model, it is convenient to introduce two continuous variables z Figure 13 avoids the variables f kp and g kp by using basic duality theory on the first model.
As in the example, an optimal valid pattern for partial controlled rounding could require too many modified values. To overcome this disadvantage, as proposed for the partial suppression methodology, it might be possible to bound the maximum number of nominal values to be modified. To this end, an additional binary variable x i is required for each cell i ∈ I. Variable x i assumes value 1 when v i = a i (i.e., z First LP model for partial controlled rounding.
1 . To restore additivity and produce a congruent table, the nonsensitive values may also be replaced.
The aim is to find the new values in such a way that the original and the modified tables are as close as possible. Because no other requirement is considered, the CTA problem of finding the new values admits a very simple ILP model. In a similar way, the partial controlled rounding methodology also looks for a congruent table as close as possible to the original one; but in addition, the partial controlled rounding guarantees all the protection level requirements as defined in §2. This consideration justifies the large number of inequalities in the models in Figures 12  and 13 , because it also happens with the models describing the other methodologies in this paper. These constraints are not considered in the CTA model: For example, if the CTA problem has an optimal solution with a p replaced by upl p 1 , publishing this solution does not imply that the attacker will find another congruent table with a value at most lpl p 1 in cell p. Hence, CTA only guarantees either the upper or the lower protection level for each sensitive cell. Even more, CTA looks for one table y i i ∈ I satisfying one protection level for each sensitive cell. Partial controlled rounding looks for a table v i i ∈ I such that, when published, for each sensitive cell there will exist congruent tables y i i ∈ I satisfying each protection level requirement. These observations do not mean that CTA is a wrong methodology in statistical disclosure limitation, but they point out that CTA is not devoted to produce optimal solutions in accordance with the definitions in §2.
Conclusions
We have presented models for four different methodologies, all sharing the same concept of protection. The concept of Second LP model for partial controlled rounding.
, protection is based on guaranteeing the existence of different congruent tables against worst-case attackers with deterministic lower and upper bounds on the cells. It is not based on preserving statistical properties on this set of congruent tables with respect to the original table, which can be approximated through some input parameters provided by the statistical office to define the loss of information of a pattern. The optimization problem of finding a protected pattern with minimum loss of information for each methodology has been presented through two ILP models. The first one contains a polynomial number of variables and constraints. It uses two variables f kp i and g kp i for each attacker k ∈ K, sensitive cell p ∈ P , and cell i ∈ I. Basic dual theory in LP provides a procedure to avoid the use of these variables by adding some "capacity constraints," leading to a second model with only one variable for each cell.
It is also possible to apply a combination of the different methodologies. For example, let us suppose that there is a partition of the cell set I into I 1 ∪ I 2 , and the statistical office is interested in publishing intervals y
1 , using partial cell suppression methodology, and publishing perturbed values v i when i ∈ I 2 , using partial controlled rounding methodology. Then, a combined methodology can be mathematically modeled by observing that the feasible region of the attacker problems associated with attacker k is for all i ∈ I By combining the appropriated variables it is also possible to write two models for each single methodology, as this paper has shown.
From the first models it is clear that the optimization problems of partial cell suppression and partial controlled rounding methodologies are both polynomially solvable as they do not require integer variables. The combinatorial problems associated with cell suppression and controlled rounding methodologies are NP-hard problems. However, the second models are suitable for solving real-world instances by a cutting-plane approach. The main idea is that not all the capacity constraints have to be in the master problem because they are in an exponential number. Within an iterative procedure, only some of them are considered, and an important missing one can be computed from the dual variables after solving a linear program (the subproblem). Then, the subproblem feeds the master problem with capacity constraints, but it is also important to clean unnecessary constraints from the master problem so as to keep the master problem in a size manageable by an LP solver. See, for example, Wolsey (1998) for details on cuttingplane methods.
An important remark when solving the second models of cell suppression and of controlled rounding arises by observing that each capacity constraint has the form This simple operation leads to strengthening the LP relaxation of the models, which is of fundamental use to produce lower bounds and speed up enumerative and heuristic approaches. Also, other additional inequalities can be inserted to produce a further improvement of the LP relaxation, like the so-called cover inequalities (see, e.g., Wolsey 1998) .
This paper has presented a unified mathematical framework for four methodologies, all differing in the structure of the output patterns but sharing the same concept of protection. The mathematical models also allow the controlling of other useful features. For example, considering a model with the x i variables for each methodology, it is easy to observe that the statistical office could also control the number of suppressions, intervals, roundings, and perturbations by just including constraint i∈I x i q, where q is the desired upper bound. Moreover, it is possible to extend the methodologies to consider "conditional protection levels on nonsensitive cells." Indeed, if it is required that an interval y The common framework introduced in this paper is implemented in ARGUS, a software package of disclosure limitation tools developed within the CASC project (Hundepool 2002) . Although some experts in statistical disclosure limitation have criticized the definitions of protection and loss of information used in ARGUS, this paper is based on these assumptions and presents a mathematical framework to address four different methodologies.
